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Abstract
A game-theoretic model is proposed to study the cross-layer problem of joint power and rate control
with quality of service (QoS) constraints in multiple-access networks. In the proposed game, each user
seeks to choose its transmit power and rate in a distributed manner in order to maximize its own utility
while satisfying its QoS requirements. The user’s QoS constraints are specified in terms of the average
source rate and an upper bound on the average delay where the delay includes both transmission and
queuing delays. The utility function considered here measures energy efficiency and is particularly suitable
for wireless networks with energy constraints. The Nash equilibrium solution for the proposed non-
cooperative game is derived and a closed-form expression for the utility achieved at equilibrium is obtained.
It is shown that the QoS requirements of a user translate into a “size” for the user which is an indication
of the amount of network resources consumed by the user. Using this competitive multiuser framework,
the tradeoffs among throughput, delay, network capacity and energy efficiency are studied. In addition,
analytical expressions are given for users’ delay profiles and the delay performance of the users at Nash
equilibrium is quantified.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Future wireless networks are expected to support a variety of services with diverse quality
of service (QoS) requirements. Because of the hostile characteristics of wireless channels and
scarcity of radio resources such as power and bandwidth, efficient resource allocation schemes
are necessary for design of high-performance wireless networks. The objective is to use the radio
resources as efficiently as possible and at the same time satisfy the QoS requirements of the users
in the network. QoS is expressed in terms of constraints on rate, delay or fidelity. Since in most
practical scenarios, the users’ terminals are battery-powered, energy efficient resource allocation
is crucial to prolonging the battery life of the terminals.
In this work, we study the cross-layer problem of QoS-constrained joint power and rate control
in wireless networks using a game-theoretic framework. We consider a multiple-access network
and propose a non-cooperative game in which each user seeks to choose its transmit power and
rate in such a way as to maximize its energy-efficiency (measured in bits per Joule) and at the
same time satisfy its QoS requirements. The QoS constraints are in terms of the average source
rate and the upper bound on the average total delay (transmission plus queuing delay). We derive
the Nash equilibrium solution for the proposed game and use this framework to study trade-offs
among throughput, delay, network capacity and energy efficiency. Network capacity here refers to
the maximum number of users that can be accommodated by the network. While the delay QoS
considered here is in terms of average delay, we also derive analytical expressions for the user’s
delay profile and quantify the delay performance at Nash equilibrium.
Joint power and rate control with QoS constraints have been studied extensively for multiple-
access networks (see for example [1] and [2]). In [1], the authors study joint power and rate
control under bit-error rate (BER) and average delay constraints. [2] considers the problem of
globally optimizing the transmit power and rate to maximize throughput of non-real-time users
2and protect the QoS of real-time users. Neither work takes into account energy-efficiency. Recently
tradeoffs between energy efficiency and delay have gained more attention. The tradeoffs in the
single-user case are studied in [3]–[6]. The multiuser problem in turn is considered in [7] and
[8]. In [7], the authors present a centralized scheduling scheme to transmit the arriving packets
within a specific time interval such that the total energy consumed is minimized whereas in [8],
a distributed ALOHA-type scheme is proposed for achieving energy-delay tradeoffs. Joint power
and rate control for maximizing goodput in delay-constrained networks is studied in [9].
Recently, game theory has been used for studying power control in code-division-multiple-access
(CDMA) networks [10]–[24]). Each user seeks to choose its transmit power in order to maximize
its utility. In [15] and [20], the utility function in (7) is chosen for the users and the corresponding
Nash equilibrium solution is derived. In [11] and [12], the authors use a utility function that
measures the number of reliable bits that are transmitted per joule of energy consumed. The
analysis is extended in [19] by introducing pricing to improve the efficiency of Nash equilibrium.
Joint energy-efficient power control and receiver design is studied in [22]. In addition, a game-
theoretic approach to energy-efficient power allocation in multicarrier systems is presented in
[23]. Joint network-centric and user-centric power control is discussed in [16]. In [17], the utility
function is assumed to be proportional to the user’s throughput and a pricing function based on the
normalized received power of the user is proposed. S-modular power control games are studied in
[21]. The prior work in this area does not explicitly take into account the QoS requirements of the
users. While [24] proposes a delay-constrained power control game, it considers the transmission
delay only and does not perform any rate control.
This work is the first study of QoS-constrained power and rate control in multiple-access
networks using a game-theoretic framework. In our proposed game-theoretic model, users choose
their transmit powers and rates in a competitive and distributed manner in order to maximize
their energy efficiency and at the same time satisfy their delay and rate QoS requirements. Using
this framework, we also analyze the tradeoffs among throughput, delay, network capacity and
energy efficiency. While centralized resource allocation schemes can achieve a better performance
3compared to distributed algorithms, in most practical scenarios, distributed algorithms are preferred
over centralized ones. Centralized algorithms tend to be complex and not easily scalable. Hence,
throughout this article, we focus on distributed algorithms with emphasis on energy efficiency.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the system
model. The proposed joint power and rate control game is discussed in Section III and its Nash
equilibrium solution is derived in Section IV. We then describe an admission control scheme
in Section V. The users’ delay performance is analyzed in Section VI. Based on our analysis,
the tradeoffs among throughput, delay, network capacity and energy efficiency are studied in
Section VII using numerical results. Finally, we give conclusions in Section VIII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a direct-sequence CDMA (DS-CDMA) network and propose a non-cooperative
(distributed) game in which each user seeks to choose its transmit power and rate to maximize its
energy efficiency (measured in bits per joule) while satisfying its QoS requirements. We specify
the QoS constraints of user k by (rk, Dk) where rk is the average source rate and Dk is the upper
bound on average delay. The delay includes both queuing and transmission delays. The incoming
traffic is assumed to have a Poisson distribution with parameter λk which represents the average
packet arrival rate with each packet consisting of M bits. The source rate (in bit per second), rk,
is hence given by
rk = Mλk. (1)
The user transmits the arriving packets at a rate Rk (bps) and with a transmit power equal to
pk Watts. We consider an automatic-repeat-request (ARQ) mechanism in which the user keeps
retransmitting a packet until the packet is received at the access point without any errors. The
incoming packets are assumed to be stored in a queue and transmitted in a first-in-first-out (FIFO)
fashion. The packet transmission time for user k is defined as
τk =
M
Rk
+ ǫk ≃
M
Rk
, (2)
4where ǫk represents the time taken for the user to receive an ACK/NACK from the access point.
We assume ǫk is negligible compared to MRk . The packet success probability (per transmission)
is represented by f(γk) where γk is the received signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SIR) for
user k. The retransmissions are assumed to be independent. The packet success rate, f(γ), is
assumed to be increasing and S-shaped1 (sigmoidal) with f(0) = 0 and f(∞) = 1. This is a
valid assumption for many practical scenarios as long as the packet size is reasonably large (e.g.,
M = 100 bits) [22].
We can represent the combination of user k’s queue and wireless link as an M/G/1 queue, as
shown in Fig. 1 where the traffic is Poisson with parameter λk (in packets per second) and the
service time, Sk, has the following probability mass function (PMF):
Pr{Sk = mτk} = f(γk) (1− f(γk))m−1 for m = 1, 2, · · · (3)
As a result, we have
E{Sk} =
∞∑
m=1
mτk (1− f(γk))
m−1 =
τk
f(γk)
. (4)
Consequently, the service rate, µk, is given by
µk =
1
E{Sk}
=
f(γk)
τk
, (5)
and the load factor ρk = λkµk =
λkτk
f(γk)
.
To keep the queue of user k stable, we must have ρk < 1 or f(γk) > λkτk. Now, let Wk be a
random variable representing the total packet delay for user k. This delay includes the time the
packet spends in the queue, W (q)k , as well as the service time, Sk. Hence, we have
Wk = W
(q)
k + Sk. (6)
It is known that for an M/G/1 queue the average wait time (including the queuing and service
time) is given by
W¯k =
L¯k
λk
, (7)
1An increasing function is S-shaped if there is a point above which the function is concave, and below which the function is
convex.
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Fig. 1. System model based on an M/G/1 queue.
where L¯k = ρk +
ρ2k+λ
2
kσ
2
Sk
2(1−ρk)
with σ2Sk being the variance of the service time [25]. Therefore, the
average packet delay for user k is given by
W¯k = τk
(
1− λkτk
2
f(γk)− λkτk
)
with f(γk) > λkτk. (8)
We require the average packet delay for user k to be less than or equal to Dk, i.e.,
W¯k ≤ Dk (9)
This translates to
f(γk) ≥ λkτk +
τk
Dk
−
λkτ
2
k
2Dk
. (10)
However, since 0 ≤ f(γk) ≤ 1, we must have2
0 ≤ λkτk +
τk
Dk
−
λkτ
2
k
2Dk
< 1. (11)
This means that rk = Mλk and Dk are feasible if only if they satisfy (11). Note that since the
upper bound on the average delay cannot be smaller than the transmission time, i.e., Dk
τk
≥ 1, then
we must have Rk ≥M/Dk. This automatically implies that λkτk + τkDk −
λkτ
2
k
2Dk
> 0.
Let us define ηk = λkτk + τkDk −
λkτ
2
k
2Dk
. Then, (10) is equivalent to the condition γ ≥ γˆk where
γˆk = f
−1(ηk) , (12)
2Note that f(γ) = 1 requires an infinite SIR which is not practical.
6with ηk < 1 and Rk ≥ M/Dk. This means that the delay constraint in (9) translated into a lower
bound on the output SIR.
III. THE JOINT POWER AND RATE CONTROL GAME
Consider the non-cooperative joint power and rate control game (PRCG) G = [K, {Ak}, {uk}]
where K = {1, 2, · · · , K} is the set of users, Ak = [0, Pmax]× [0, B] is the strategy set for user
k with a strategy corresponding to a choice of transmit power and transmit rate, and uk is the
utility function for user k. Here, Pmax and B are the maximum transmit power and the system
bandwidth, respectively. For the sake simplicity, throughout this paper, we assume Pmax is large.
Each user chooses its transmit power and rate in order to maximize its own utility while satisfying
its QoS requirements. The utility function for a user is defined as the ratio of the user’s goodput
to its transmit power, i.e.,
uk =
Tk
pk
, (13)
where the goodput Tk is the number of bits that is transmitted successfully per second and is
given by
Tk = Rkf(γk). (14)
Therefore, the utility function for user k is given by
uk = Rk
f(γk)
pk
. (15)
This utility function, which was first introduced in [11], [12], has units of bits per joule and is
particularly suitable for wireless networks where energy efficiency is important.
Fixing the other users’ transmit powers and rates, the utility-maximizing strategy for user k is
given by the solution of the following constrained maximization:
max
pk,Rk
uk s.t. W¯k ≤ Dk , (16)
or equivalently
max
pk,Rk
uk s.t. γk ≥ γˆk (17)
7with 0 ≤ ηk < 1 where
γˆk = f
−1(ηk), (18)
and
ηk =
rk
Rk
+
M
DkRk
−
Mrk
2DkR2k
. (19)
Note that for a matched filter receiver and with random spreading sequences, the received SIR is
approximately given by
γk =
(
B
Rk
)
pkhk
σ2 +
∑
j 6=k pjhj
, (20)
where hk is the channel gain for user k and σ2 is the noise power in the bandwidth B.
Let us first look at the maximization in (17) without any constraints. Based on (20), we can
write
max
pk,Rk
uk ≡ max
γk ,Rk
Bhˆk
f(γk)
γk
. (21)
Proposition 1: The unconstrained utility maximization in (21) has an infinite number of
solutions. More specifically, any combination of pk and Rk that achieves an output SIR equal
to γ∗, the solution to f(γ) = γf ′(γ), maximizes uk.
Proof: Notice from (21) that when the other users’ powers and rates are fixed (i.e., fixed
hˆk), user k’s utility depends only on γ and is independent of the specific values of pk and Rk. In
addition, by taking the derivative of f(γ)
γ
with respect to γ and equating it to zero, it can be shown
that f(γ)
γ
is maximized when γ = γ∗, the (unique) positive solution of f(γ) = γf ′(γ). Therefore,
uk is maximized for any combination of pk and Rk for which γk = γ∗. This means that there are
infinitely many solutions for the unconstrained maximization in (21).
Now, considering that τk = M/Rk must be less than or equal to Dk, the condition 0 ≤ ηk < 1
is equivalent to
Rk >
(
M
Dk
)
1 +Dkλk +
√
1 +D2kλ
2
k
2
. (22)
Let us define
Ω∞k =
(
M
Dk
)
1 +Dkλk +
√
1 +D2kλ
2
k
2
.
8Note that for Rk = Ω∞k , we have ηk = 1 and hence γˆk =∞. Also, define Ω∗k as the rate for which
γˆk = γ
∗
, i.e.,
Ω∗k =
(
M
Dk
)
1 +Dkλk +
√
1 +D2kλ
2
k + 2(1− f
∗)Dkλk
2f ∗
(23)
where f ∗ = f(γ∗). It is straightforward to show that γˆk is a decreasing function of Rk for all
Rk ≥ Ω
∞
k . Therefore, γˆk > γ∗ for all Ω∞k ≤ Rk < Ω∗k. This means that user k has no incentive
to transmit at a rate smaller than Ω∗k. Furthermore, based on Proposition 1, any combination of
pk and Rk ≥ Ω∗k which results in an output SIR equal to γ∗ is a solution to the constrained
maximization in (17). Note that when Rk = Ω∗k and γk = γ∗, we have W¯k = Dk.
If γ∗ is not feasible due to the maximum transmit power limitation, the user has to adjust its
transmission rate and target SIR to satisfy its QoS constraints. In particular, user k would choose
Ω˜k as its transmission rate such that its transmit rate and target SIR such that
Ω˜k =
(
M
Dk
)
1 +Dkλk +
√
1 +D2kλ
2
k + 2 (1− f(γ˜))Dkλk
2f(γ˜k)
where
γ˜k = (B/Ω˜k)Pmaxhˆk.
This, of course, results in a reduction in the user’s energy efficiency.
IV. NASH EQUILIBRIUM FOR THE PRCG
For a non-cooperative game, a Nash equilibrium is defined as a set of strategies for which no
user can unilaterally improve its own utility [26]. We saw in Section III that for our proposed
non-cooperative game, each user has infinitely many strategies that maximize the user’s utility.
In particular, any combination of pk and Rk for which γk = γ∗ and Rk ≥ Ω∗k is a best-response
strategy.
Proposition 2: If
∑K
k=1
1
1+ B
Ω∗
k
γ∗
< 1, then the PRCG has at least one Nash equilibrium given
by (p∗k,Ω∗k), for k = 1, · · · , K, where p∗k = σ
2
hk

 11+ BΩ∗kγ∗
1−
PK
j=1
1
1+ B
Ω∗
j
γ∗

 and Ω∗k is given by (23).
Furthermore, when there are more than one Nash equilibrium, (p∗k,Ω∗k) is the Pareto-dominant
equilibrium.
9Proof: If ∑Kj=1 11+ B
Ω∗
j
γ∗
< 1 then p∗k = σ
2
hk

 11+ BΩ∗kγ∗
1−
PK
j=1
1
1+ B
Ω∗
j
γ∗

 is positive and finite. Now, if
we let pk = p∗k and Rk = Ω∗k, then the output SIR for all the users will be equal to γ∗ which
means every user is using its best-response strategy. Therefore, (p∗k, R∗k) for k = 1, · · · , K is a
Nash equilibrium.
More generally, if we let Rk = R˜k ≥ Ω∗k and provided that
∑K
j=1
1
1+ B
R˜jγ
∗
< 1, then (p˜k, R˜k) is
a Nash equilibrium where p˜k = σ
2
hk

 11+ BR˜kγ∗
1−
PK
j=1
1
1+ B
R˜jγ
∗


.
Based on (15), at Nash equilibrium, the utility of user k is given by
uk =
Bf(γ∗)hk
σ2γ∗

1−
∑K
j=1
1
1+ B
R˜jγ
∗
1− 1
1+ B
R˜kγ
∗


=
Bf(γ∗)hk
σ2γ∗

1−
∑
j 6=k
1
1+ B
R˜jγ
∗
1− 1
1+ B
R˜kγ
∗

 . (24)
Therefore, the Nash equilibrium with the smallest R˜k achieves the largest utility. A higher
transmission rate for a user requires a larger transmit power by that user to achieve γ∗. This not
only reduces the user’s utility but also causes more interference for other users in the network
and forces them to raise their transmit powers as well which will result in a reduction in their
utilities. This means that the Nash equilibrium with Rk = Ω∗k and p∗k for k = 1, · · · , K is the
Pareto-efficient Nash equilibrium.
We define the “size” of user k as
Φ∗k =
1
1 + B
Ω∗kγ
∗
. (25)
Based on this definition, the feasibility condition
∑K
k=1
1
1+ B
Ω∗
k
γ∗
< 1 can be written as
K∑
k=1
Φ∗k < 1. (26)
Note that the QoS requirements of user k (i.e., its source rate rk and delay constraint Dk)
uniquely determine Ω∗k through (23) and, in turn, determine the size of the user (i.e., Φ∗k) through
(25). The size of a user is basically an indication of the amount of network resources consumed
by that user. A larger source rate or a tighter delay constraint for a user increases the size of the
10
user. The network can accommodate a set of users if and only if their total size is less than 1.
In Section VII, we use this framework to study the tradeoffs among throughput, delay, network
capacity and energy efficiency.
V. ADMISSION CONTROL
In Section IV, we defined the “size” of a user based on its QoS requirements. Before joining the
network, each user calculates its size using (25) and announces it to the access point. According
to (26), the access point admits those users whose total size is less than 1. While the goal of
each user is to maximize its own energy efficiency, a more sophisticated admission control can
be performed to maximize the total network utility. In other words, out of the K users, the access
point can choose those users for which the total network utility is the largest, i.e.,
max
L⊂{1,··· ,K}
∑
ℓ∈L
uℓ (27)
under the constraint that
∑
ℓ∈LΦ
∗
ℓ < 1.
Based on (24), the utility of user ℓ at the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium is given by
uℓ =
(
Bhℓf(γ
∗)
σ2γ∗
)
1−
∑
i∈L Φ
∗
i
1− Φ∗ℓ
. (28)
As a result, (27) becomes
max
L⊂{1,··· ,K}
∑
ℓ∈L
hℓ
1−
∑
i∈LΦ
∗
i
1− Φ∗ℓ
or equivalently
max
L⊂{1,··· ,K}
(
1−
∑
i∈L
Φ∗i
)∑
ℓ∈L
hℓ
1− Φ∗ℓ
(29)
under the constraint that
∑
ℓ∈LΦ
∗
ℓ < 1.
In general, obtaining a closed-form solution for (29) is difficult. Instead, in order to gain some
insight, let us consider the special case in which all users are at the same distance from the access
point. We first consider the scenario in which the users have identical QoS requirements (i.e.,
Φ∗1 = · · · = Φ
∗
K = Φ
∗). If we replace ∑Lℓ=1 hℓ by LE{h}, then (29) becomes
max
L
E{h}(L− L2Φ∗)
1− Φ∗
. (30)
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Therefore, the optimal number of users for maximizing the total utility in the network is L =
[
1
2Φ∗
]
where [x] represents the integer nearest to x.
Now consider another scenario in which there are C classes of users. The users in class c are
assumed to all have the same QoS requirements and hence the same size, Φ∗(c). Since we are
assuming that all the users have the same distance from the access point, they all have the same
channel gains. Now, if the access point admits L(c) users from class c then the total utility is given
by
uT =
(
Bhf(γ∗)
σ2γ∗
)(
1−
C∑
c=1
L(c)Φ∗(c)
)(
C∑
c=1
L(c)
1− Φ∗(c)
)
provided that
∑C
c=1L
(c)Φ∗(c) < 1. Without loss of generality, let us assume that Φ∗(1) < Φ∗(2) <
· · · < Φ∗(C). It can be shown that uT is maximized when L(1) =
[
1
2Φ∗(1)
]
with L(c) = 0 for
c = 2, 3, · · · , C. This is because adding a user from class 1 is always more beneficial in terms
of increasing the total utility than adding a user from any other class. Therefore, in order to
maximize the total utility in the network, the access point should admit only users from the class
with the smallest size. While this solution maximizes the total network utility, it is not fair. A
more sophisticated admission control mechanism can be used to improve the fairness.
VI. DELAY PERFORMANCE
In Section II, we defined the delay requirement of a user as an upper bound on the average total
packet delay for that user where the total delay, Wk, is given by the sum of the queuing delay
and service time. We have considered a scenario in which users choose their transmit powers
and rates in a selfish and distributed manner such that they maximize their own energy efficiency
while satisfying their delay requirements. In Section IV, we showed that at the Pareto-dominant
Nash equilibrium, the transmit power and rate of a user are such that the delay bound is met with
equality. However, it would be useful to obtain the delay profile of a user so that the deviations
of the true delay from the average value can be quantified. More specifically, we would like to
find a closed-form expression for Pr{Wk ≤ c} for all c.
12
To that end, let us define wk(t) as the probability density function (PDF) of Wk. Then, we have
Pr{Wk ≤ c} =
∫ c
0
wk(t)dt . (31)
Let W ∗k (s) represent the Laplace transform for wk(t), i.e.,
W ∗k (s) =
∫ ∞
0
e−stwk(t)dt . (32)
It is known that for M/G/1 queues, we have
W ∗k (s) =
(1− ρk)sB
∗
k(s)
s− λk[1− B∗k(s)]
(33)
where B∗k(s) =
∫∞
0
e−stbk(t)dt with bk(t) being the PDF of the service time Sk [25]. Based on
(3), bk(t) is given by
bk(t) =
∞∑
m=1
f(γk) (1− f(γk))
m−1 δ(t−mτk) (34)
where δ(·) is the Dirac delta function. Therefore, we have
B∗k(s) =
f(γk)
esτk − 1 + f(γk)
. (35)
As a result,
W ∗k (s) =
(1− ρk)f(γk)s
s (esτk − 1 + f(γk))− λk (esτk − 1)
. (36)
However, obtaining a closed-form expression for wk(t) based on W ∗k (s) in (36) is very difficult.
But, recall from Section II that
Wk = W
(q)
k + Sk.
Based on this we have
W
(q)∗
k (s) =
W ∗k (s)
B∗k(s)
=
(1− ρk)s (e
sτk − 1 + f(γk))
s (esτk − 1 + f(γk))− λk (esτk − 1)
. (37)
While finding the inverse Laplace transform of (37) is also difficult, we will shortly derive an
accurate approximation for w(q)k (t). Before doing that, let us first obtain the mean and variance
of W (q)k and Sk. For simplicity of notation, we will drop the subscript k but it should be noted
that all of our results are user dependent. Also, we replace f(γ) by f .
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Based on (3), the mean and variance of S are, respectively, given by
S¯ =
τ
f
(38)
and
σ2S =
τ 2
f 2
(1− f). (39)
From the known properties of M/G/1 queues [25], the mean and variance of W (q) are, respectively,
given by
W¯ (q) =
τ
f

(1− f2 )
(
λτ
f
)
1− λτ
f

 (40)
and
σ2W (q) = E
{
W (q)
2
}
− W¯ (q)
2
=
λ
1− ρ
[
W¯ (q)E{S2}+
E{S3}
3
]
− W¯ (q)
2
.
After some manipulations, it can be shown that the variance of W (q) is given by
σ2W (q) =
τ 2
f 2
(1− f)

 1(
1− λτ
f
)2 + f
2
(
λτ
f
)(
4− λτ
f
)
12(1− f)(1− λτ
f
)2
− 1

 . (41)
To gain some insights into the contributions of the queuing delay and service time to the overall
delay, let us define
ν =
W¯ (q)
S¯
and
χ =
√
σ2
W (q)
σ2S
.
Then, we have
ν =
(1− f
2
)
(
λτ
f
)
1− λτ
f
, (42)
and
χ =

 1(
1− λτ
f
)2 + f
2
(
λτ
f
)(
4− λτ
f
)
12(1− f)(1− λτ
f
)2
− 1


1/2
(43)
At the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium, we have τ = M
Ω∗
and γ = γ∗. Therefore, based on (23),
we have
λτ
f
= 2

1 + 1
Dλ
+
√
1 +
2(1− f ∗)
Dλ
+
(
1
Dλ
)2
−1
. (44)
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Fig. 2. Plots of ν = W¯ (q)
S¯
and χ =
r
σ2
W (q)
σ2
S
as a function of d = Dλ. λ is the average source rate in packets per second and
D is the average delay bound in seconds.
Since f ∗ is fixed and (44) only depends on the product Dλ, then ν and χ also depend only on the
product of D and λ, not their individual values. Recall that λ is the average source rate (in packets
per second) and D is the average delay bound. Together, they specify the QoS requirements of a
user. Let d = Dλ. So, for example, if the packet size M is 100 bits, a source rate of r = 50kbps
results in λ = 500pps. Then if the delay bound D is 50ms, we have d = 25. Fig. 2 shows the
plots of ν and χ versus d for f(γ) = (1− e−γ)M .
Two important observations can be made from Fig. 2. First of all, for moderate and large values
of d (e.g., d > 10), the average delay is dominated by the average wait time in the queue (i.e.,
W¯ (q)). When d is small, the average wait time in the queue and the average service time are
comparable. For very small values of d, the service time dominates the total delay. Secondly, for
most values of d (i.e., d > 4), the standard deviation of W (q) is at least ten times larger than
that of S. This means that the variations in the total delay are caused mainly by the variations in
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W¯ (q). Therefore, in many cases, the variations in the total delay can be accurately approximated
by the variations in the queuing delay.
Now let w(q)(t) be the PDF of the queuing delay. According to (37), the Laplace transform of
w(q)(t) is given by
W (q)∗(s) =
(1− ρ)s (esτ − 1 + f)
s(esτ − 1 + f)− λ(esτ − 1)
.
We can equivalently write W (q)∗(s) as
W (q)∗(s) = P0(s) + P1(s) + P2(s)
where
P0(s) = (1− ρ), (45)
P1(s) =
(1− ρ)λ(esτ − 1)
s(esτ − 1 + f)
, (46)
and
P2(s) =
(1− ρ)λ2(esτ − 1)2
s [s(esτ − 1 + f)− λ(esτ − 1)] (esτ − 1 + f)
. (47)
Based on (45), we have
p1(t) = (1− ρ)δ(t). (48)
Proposition 3: The inverse Laplace transform of (46) is given by
p1(t) = λ(1− ρ)(1− f)
⌊ t
τ
⌋, (49)
where ⌊x⌋ represents the nearest integer smaller than x.
Proof: See the appendix for the proof.
As a result of Proposition 3, we have
w(q)(t) = (1− ρ)δ(t) + λ(1− ρ)(1− f)⌊
t
τ
⌋ + p2(t). (50)
Now if we restrict our attention to 0 ≤ t ≤ tmax where tmax >> D, then we can approximate
p2(t) numerically using the following:
P2(iω) =
∫ tmax
0
p2(t)e
−iωtdt ≃
N−1∑
n=0
p2
(
tmax
N
n
)
e−iω
tmax
N
n
(
tmax
N
)
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or (
N
tmax
)
P2(iω) =
N−1∑
n=0
p2
(
tmax
N
n
)
e−iω
tmax
N
n.
Now, since the FFT of a discrete signal zn is given by
Zk =
N−1∑
n=0
zne
−i 2pikn
N ,
p2
(
tmax
N
n
)
can be obtained by taking the IFFT of
(
N
tmax
)
P2(s)|s=i 2pik
100D
3
. In Section VII, we use
this approximation along with (50) to obtain w(q)(t) and, consequently, approximate Pr{W (q) ≤ c}.
This allows us to quantify the delay performance of the users at Nash equilibrium.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Let us consider the uplink of a DS-CDMA system with a total bandwidth of 5MHz (i.e. B =
5MHz). A useful example for the efficiency function is f(γ) = (1− e−γ)M . This serves as an
approximation to the packet success rate that is very reasonable for moderate to large values
of M . We use this efficiency function for our simulations. Using this, with M = 100, we have
γ∗ = 6.48 = 8.1dB. Each user in the network has a set of QoS requirements expressed as (rk, Dk)
where rk is the source rate and Dk is the delay requirement (upper bound on the average total
delay) for user k. As explained in Section IV, the QoS parameters of a user define a “size” for
that user, denoted by Φ∗k given by (25). Before a user starts transmitting, it must announce its size
to the access point. Based on the particular admission policy, the access point decides whether
or not to admit the user. Throughout this section, we assume that the admitted users choose the
transmit powers and rates that correspond to their Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium.
Fig. 3 shows the user’s utility as a function of delay for different source rates. The total size of
the other users in the network is assumed to be 0.2. The user’s utility is normalized by Bh/σ2,
and the delay is normalized by the inverse of the system bandwidth. As expected, a tighter delay
requirement and/or a higher source rate results in a lower utility for the user.
3Since p2(t) is real, before taking the IFFT, we have to make sure that the samples of P2(s) satisfy the symmetry properties
associated with the FFT of real signals.
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Fig. 3. Normalized utility as a function of normalized delay for different source rates (B = 5 MHz). The combined “size” of
other users in the network is equal to 0.2.
Fig. 4 shows the user size, network capacity, transmission rate, and total goodput as a function of
normalized delay for different source rates. The network capacity refers to the maximum number
of users that can be admitted into the network assuming that all the users have the same QoS
requirements (i.e., the same size). The transmission rate and goodput are normalized by the system
bandwidth. The total goodput is obtained by multiplying the source rate by the total number of
users. For example, a user with a source rate of 50 kbps and an average delay constraint of 50 ms
(i.e., r = 50 kbps and D = 50 ms) has a size equal to 0.072. As the QoS requirements become
more stringent (i.e., a higher source rate and/or a smaller delay), the size of the user increases
which means more network resources are required to accommodate the user. This results in a
reduction in the network capacity. For r = 50 kbps and D = 50 ms, the transmission rate is
equal to 59.65 kbps, the network capacity is equal to 13, and the total goodput is 650 kbps. It is
also observed from the figure that when the delay constraint is loose, the total goodput is almost
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independent of the source rate. This is because a lower source rate is compensated by the fact
that more users can be admitted into the network. On the other hand, when the delay constraint
in tight, the total goodput is higher for larger source rates.
Now, to study admission control, let us consider a network with three different classes of
users/sources:
1) Class A users for which r(A) = 5 kbps and D(A) = 10 ms.
2) Class B users for which r(B) = 50 kbps and D(B) = 50 ms.
3) Class C users for which r(C) = 150 kbps and D(C) = 1000 ms.
We can calculate the size of a user in each class using (25) to get Φ∗(A) = 0.0198, Φ∗(B) = 0.0718,
and Φ∗(C) = 0.1848. This means that users in classes B and C respectively consume approximately
3.6 and 9.3 times as much resources as a user in class A.
For the purpose of illustration and to keep the comparison fair, let us assume that there are a large
number of users in each class and that they all are at the same distance from the access point (i.e.,
they all have the same average channel gain). The access point receives requests from the users
and has to decide which ones to admit in order to maximize the total utility in the network (see
(29)). We know from Section V that since users in class A have the smallest size, the total utility
is maximized if the access point picks users from class A only with L(A) =
[
1/2Φ∗
(A)
]
= 25.
However, this solution does not take into account fairness. Instead, we may be more interested
in cases where more than one class of users are admitted. Table I shows the percentage loss in
the total utility (energy efficiency) for several choices of L(A), L(B) and L(C). It is observed that
admitting “large” users into the network results in significant reductions in the energy efficiency
and capacity of the network.
Let us now focus on the delay profile of a user in class B. For this user, we have r(B) = 50 kbps
(or λ(B) = 500 pps) and D(B) = 50 ms. Therefore, d(B) = 25. From (38)–(41), we have S¯(B) =
2 ms, σ
(B)
S = 0.74 ms, W¯
(q)(B) = 48 ms and σ(B)
W (q)
= 48 ms. It is clear that for this user the
queuing delay is the dominant component of the total delay. This can also be seen from Fig. 2.
Therefore, the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of W (B), i.e., Pr{W (B) ≤ t}, can be very
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delay for different source rates (B = 5 MHz).
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TABLE I
PERCENTAGE LOSS IN THE TOTAL NETWORK UTILITY FOR DIFFERENT CHOICES OF L(A), L(B) AND L(C).
L(A) L(B) L(C) Loss in total utility
25 0 0 –
23 1 0 10%
20 0 1 30%
18 1 1 38%
0 7 0 71%
0 0 3 87%
accurately approximated by the CDF of W (q)(B). Hence, we can use (50) to numerically compute
the CDF of the queuing delay. This CDF is plotted in Fig. 5. It is seen from the figure that about
63% of the time, the delay experienced by a packet is less than the average delay bound and 85%
of the time, the delay is less than twice the average delay.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the cross-layer problem of QoS-constrained power and rate control in wireless
networks using a game-theoretic framework. We have proposed a non-cooperative game in which
users seek to choose their transmit powers and rates in such a way as to maximize their utilities
and at the same time satisfy their QoS requirements. The utility function considered here measures
the number of reliable bits transmitted per joule of energy consumed. The QoS requirements for a
user consist of the average source rate and an upper bound on the average delay where the delay
includes both transmission and queuing delays. We have derived the Nash equilibrium solution
for the proposed game and obtained a closed-form solution for the user’s utility at equilibrium.
Using this framework, we have studied the tradeoffs among throughput, delay, network capacity
and energy efficiency, and have shown that the presence of users with stringent QoS requirements
results in significant reductions in network capacity and energy efficiency. The delay performance
of users at Nash equilibrium are also analyzed.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Given P1(s) = (1−ρ)λ(e
sτ−1)
s(esτ−1+f)
, we can use inverse Laplace transform to write
p1(t) = lim
R→∞
1
2πi
∫ σ+iR
σ−iR
P1(s)e
stds.
Using the residue theorem and contour integration from complex analysis [27], we have
p1(t) =
∑
k
Res
[
P1(s)e
st, s∗k
]
where s∗k = 1τ [ln(1− f) + 2πik].
If we let a = ln(1− f), then we have
p1(t) = (1− ρ)λ
∞∑
k=−∞
(ea − 1)eat/τ+2πikt/τ
(1− f)(a+ 2πik)
.
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For convenience, let us define x = t/τ and notice that x ≥ 0 since the queuing delay is
non-negative. Then, we can write
p1(t) = −f(1− ρ)λ(1− f)
x−1
∞∑
k=−∞
e2πikx
a + 2πik
= −f(1− ρ)λ(1− f)x−1
∞∑
k=−∞
(a− 2πik)e2πikx
a2 + 4π2k2
.
Define h(x) =
∑∞
k=−∞
(a−2πik)e2piikx
a2+4π2k2
. Then, we have
p1(t) = −f(1− ρ)λ(1− f)
x−1h(x). (51)
We can rewrite h(x) as
h(x) =
1
2π
[
∞∑
k=−∞
be2πikx
b2 + k2
− i
∞∑
k=−∞
ke2πikx
b2 + k2
]
where b = a
2π
. We can equivalently write h(x) as
h(x) =
1
2πb
+
1
π
[
∞∑
k=1
b cos (2πkx)
b2 + k2
+
∞∑
k=1
k sin (2πkx)
b2 + k2
]
. (52)
Now, given the following Fourier series expansions [28]
∞∑
k=1
cos (ky)
b2 + k2
=
π
2b
eb(π−y) + e−b(π−y)
ebπ − e−bπ
−
1
2b2
for 0 < y < 2π
and
∞∑
k=1
k sin (ky)
b2 + k2
=
π
2
eb(π−y) − e−b(π−y)
ebπ − e−bπ
for 0 < y < 2π
and after some manipulations, h(x) becomes
h(x) =
e−2πb(x−n)
1− e−2πb
for n < x < n + 1.
Remembering that a = ln(1− f), we can simplify h(x) to get
h(x) =
(1− f)(1− f)−(x−n)
−f
for n < x < n+ 1. (53)
Since p1(t) = −f(1− ρ)λ(1− f)x−1h(x) and recalling that x = tτ , we get
p1(t) = λ(1− ρ)(1− f)
n for nτ < t < (n + 1)τ
or equivalently
p1(t) = λ(1− ρ)(1− f)
⌊ t
τ
⌋.
This completes the proof.
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